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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALVIN A. MA,V"SON,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No..

vs.

11658

.J. G. INVESTMENT CO.,

)

Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by appellant, hereinafter referred
to as "plaintiff," against J. G. Investment Corporation,
respondent, hereinafter referred to as "defendant," for
an order requiring defendant to remove obstructions
placed in a roadway and to remove a fence at the end
of a right of way which divides defendant's property
from adjacent property in question.
1

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable .Marcellus
K. Snow and after the trial the Court made Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law that plaintiff had no
right, title or interest in and to the raodway and gave
a judgment of dismissal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks to have the trial court's Judgment of Dismissal affirmed.

STATE.MENT OF FACTS
The defendant agrees with the Statement of Facts
as set forth in plaintiff's Brief with exception of the
final paragraph which defendant contends is erroneous
and with the exception that said statement does not set
forth sufficient of the facts to adequately inform the
court of the real matter in dispute.
The facts clearly show that the defendant has
acquired all of the separate rights in the right-of-way
and the plaintiff has no remaining right in the property described.
The defendant admits that the structures as shown
in Exhibits P-3 and P-4 protruded into the right-ofway as described some 12 to 18 inches on each side but
contend that they do not in any way interfere with
2

passage in the right-of-way. Defendant admits that
there is a fence at the east end of the right of way as
shown in Exhibits P-5 and P-6 which defendant erected
in 1966 and it has continuously remained there.
The defendant purchased 306.94 feet of property
on both sides of the east end of the right-of-way described, and at the same time it obtained a 2/5th interest
in the right-of-way, all from Maxfield C. 'Vhitehead.
Defendant also obtained a quit-claim deed from other
abutting property owners at about the same time for
what was thought to be another 2/5th interest outstanding.
The defendant proceeded to built apartments on
both sides of the right-of-way. See Exhibits P-4, P-5,
P-7, P-8, P-8, and P-10. The end of the right-of-way
abutted against a vacant field, so the defendant built
a fence along the east property line, including the east
line of the right-of-way. The plaintiff subsequently
bought the property, which has a right of access on both
the north and south, immediately to the east end of
the right-of-way in question and now claims he still
has a I/ 5th interest in the right-of-way and wants to
remove the fence for a third access to his newly-purchased land.
The plaintiff, after purchasing the I/5th interest
in the right-of-way described, together with three pieces
of land abutting thereto, sold one piece by warranty
<lee<l to Perry S. and Margaret Bradley and the deed
stated "together with a right-of-way over" without any
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reservation of exception for himself in the right-of-way.
He also sold one piece to his daughter Nilene Afton
Mawson Eskelson, and subsequently by quit claim deed
gave her a I/ 5th interest in the right-of-way which
she later transferred back to him, which he now claims
gives him his present interest. Defendant sold the final
piece to Richard and Phyllis Allen by warranty deed,
which also gave a right-of-way, but attempted to retain the fee in the right-of-way. Defendant subsequently purchased this from Allen. See Exhibit P-11.
The defendant found that .Maxfield C. Whitehead
still claimed a 2/5th interest in the right-of-way as he
had not deeded it away when he sold all his property
abutting thereon. The defendant then obtained a quit
claim deed on the other 2/5ths 'V'hitehead owned, giving defendant 5/5ths of the property in dispute. (See
Findings of Fact R 52-56.)
DEFENDANT'S POSITION
The trial court's Judgment of dismissal of the
plaintiff's complaint should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

"r

THE COURT MADE EXTENSIVE FINDINGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA
IN SUPPORT OF JUDGMENT AND PLAIN4

TIFF DISPUTES ONLY ONE CONCLUSION
AND NONE OF THE FINDINGS OF THE
LO,l\TER COURT.
Defendant does not dispute plaintiff's receipt of a
II 5th interest in the right of way as it claims down
thru the plaintiff part of its own title. After hearing
all the evidence the court made extensive findings and
conclusions. (R. 52-56.) Plaintiff has not attacked any
of the findings of fact and his brief only indirectly
attacks one conclusion set forth by the court. The court
found:
1. That plaintiff had transferred one of his three

pieces of property to a Mr. and Mrs. Bradley, which
deed stated "together with a right of way over" the
property in question and described the property m
question. (See R 48) of plaintiff's memorandum.
2. That plaintiff transferred the second piece of
property to his daughelr, Mrs. Eskelson. (R 53)
3. That plaintiff transferred the third piece to
Allens ( R. 53) .
4. That plaintiff had absolutely nothing left. R.
53). See findings and conclusions in detail (R-52 to

R 56).

The only dispute is the conclusion as to the effect of
the original transfer to the Bradleys, whether or not
there was anything left in the plaintiff after the transfer.
It is the contention of the defendant that the findings
should stand, as they have not been attacked, and with
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the findings intact, there could not be a change of the
conclusion of law as set forth, and the judgment should
stand. This would also hold true of the findings showing that the defendant had purchased all of the rightof-way as there was no attack on these.

POINT II
DEFENDANT HAS OBTAINED ALL THE
TITLE IN THE RIGHT-OF-WAY.

The court so found. See number 10, R. 54. There
is no dispute as to the testimony concerning the acquisition of the right-of-ways from all other sources
'
the acquisition down from plaintiff to Bradley then to
Hamilton then to the defendant.
The defendant cites 23 Am. J ur. 2d 292:
"In some states the statutes in terms provide
that transfers of land shall transfer all incidents
except those expressly excepted."
Here no exceptions were made. It further states on
page 294:
"It is well established that all easements appurtenant to land conveyed passed to the grantee,, unless a contrary intention is disclosed by
the deed of conveyance, notwithstanding the deed
does not purport expressly to include appurentenances." (Emphasis supplied)
6

\¥here plaintiff deeded without reservation, ID53
Utah Code Annotated As Amended provides at Title
57, Chapter 1, Section 12, that a warranty deed
"Shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee
simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of
the premises therein named together with all the
appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto
belonging with the covenants from the grantor,
. . . any exceptions to such covenants may be
briefly inserted ..."
That is supported in the case of Pctrofesa v. Denver and
Rio Grande Western Railroad, llO U. 109 169 P.2d
808. The court found that the defendant was not attempting to preclude the plaintiff or his daughter from
the right-of-way even though neither has any right left
in it, and it admitted by even the plaintiff's own testimony that he was able to drive to the end of the property over which he originally had I/5th right, but wants
to now connect it on and develop his land to the east.
Plaintiff has included, as obstructions to be removed,
some protrusions of 18 inches on the sides which are
all abutted by the defendant's property in addition to
the removal of the fence on the end. The exhibits clearly
show that these protrusions are merely incidental and
the fence is the main object to be removed so that the
plaintiff can develop his lot to the east.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT OFFER THE
WHOLE TRANSCRIPT AND THE COURT
7

MUST ASSU.ME THAT FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS WERE CORRECT.
Plaintiff does not offer the whole transcript of the
trial to prove his contentions, and it must be assume<l
that the findings and conclusions were correct and based
on proper evidence, as there is no evidence to refute
them and none is cited except as to the dispute on the
one conclusion. It is true that the defendant could have
designated a further position of the record, but not
having noted that it was omit,.ted until a later date,
this was not done. The plaintiff still has the burden of
showing that the original court proceedings were in
error, and there is no evidence in the record to show
that there was error.

POINT IV
THERE IS NO CONTROVERSY AS PLAINTIFF AND GRANTEES ARE NOT PRECLUDED FROM USE OF RIGHT-OF-WAY FOR
ALL LAND WHICH PLAINTIFF OWNED.
The fact that the defendant has not precluded anyone who is remotely connected with the plaintiff from
using the full length of the right-of-way makes the
whole controversy moot as plaintiff has no other right
than the use of th eright-of-way. The small protrusion
on the sides does not hinder passage as there still remains a passageway about 30 feet in width. He can
use the full length all but the last 6 inches of the
8

right-of-way, which is the width of the fence, and to
give him the additional 6 inches of use would add nothing. It would do irreparable damage to the defendant
in its use of the property, destroying the protection
for the children and impairing the value thereof. See
Conclusion 4 - R 55. To permit this with no controversy would be a gross injustice.

POINT V
THAT PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS CANNOT
BE ENLARGED TO INCLUDE MORE THAN
ORIGINALLY GRANTED.
Even if it is assumed that the plaintiff still has
his I/5th in the right-of-way, he would still not be
entitled to have the fence on the dividing line between
the defendant's property and his other property to the
east removed. At the time the original right-of-way was
created, the grantor only owned the property to the east
end of the right-of-way and only contemplated that
it would be used by those people having abutting propproperty up to the end. To include the land east of the
east end would be an enlargement of the use, which is not
permitted. The defendant quotes 25 Am. J ur. 2nd 482-3
See. 77:
"However, no use may be made of the rightof-way different from that established at the
time of its creation so as to burden the servient
estate to a greater extent than was contemplated
9

at the time of the grant ... nor may he develop
the right-of-way into a public thoroughfare.
A grant or reservation of a right to pass on a
private way to one lot does not confer the right
to pass further on the same way to another lot.
Similarly, a right of way appurtenant to a par- '
ticular lot cannot be used as a mode of access
to another lot to which it is not appurtenant."
(Emphasis supplied. )
This cites as a footnote :
"One having the right to use an alley for accsess to certain property may not use it to transport to such property goods for use on adjoining '
property."
Taken from Percy A. Brown & Co. v. Raub, 357 P. '
271, 54 A2d 35.
In the Utah case of Wood et al v. Ashby et al., 122 U.
580 253 P.2d 351, the CO!J.rt held:
"Since it is manifest that a grantee may receive only what a gr an tor has to give, def endant' s rights are based upon the construction of
the original Traugott deed to the plaintiff's
pre decessors. "
It also states:

"It is also established in
should be construed so as
tentions and desires of the
by the language made use

this state that a deed
to effectuate the inparties as manifested
of in the deed."

The Utah case of Nielsen v. Sandberg, 141 P.2d
696 28 CJ S on Easements, Sec. 65 ( b) 732 states:
'
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"And when the resulting use will increase the
burden upo1.1 the servient estate, the right to the
easement will be extinguished."
In 10 ALR 962, Right of Way, it states:
a general rule if the increased or additional use or burden brought about by the subdivision of a dominant tenement materially burdens the servient estate, the courts will not allow
the right-of-way easement to pass to the subsequent purchasers of the subdivided parts."
In 3 ALR 3d 1258, on page 1259 it states:

"The determination of the extent and reasonableness of use of a right-of-way created by express grant necessarily involves a construction
of the grant. Several basic principles govern:
1. The grant must be construed in the light of
the situation of the property and surrounding
circumstances in order to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the parties.

2. If the language of a grant is
from doubt, such language is not
interpretation, and no resort to
and circumstances may be made
clear terms of the grant.

clear and free
the subject of
extrinsic facts
to modify the

3. The past behavior of the parties in connection with the use of the right-of-way may be regarded as a practical construction of the use of
t he way ... "
At 1260 from the same treatise it provides that the
rule that the right of way cannot be used to burden the
servient tenement to an extent greater than was con-

templaetd.
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At 1261 also from 3 ALR, it provides:
"In assessing the chances of obtaining a judicial limitation of the use of 'unreasonable,' counsel will want to examine the terms of the grant
and to investigate, as far as possible, the situation
of the parties and of the land at the time the grant
was made, as well as the practical construction
given thereto by the parties over the years, since
all these matters are relevant to the determination of the scope of the easement."
At 1270 of th esame work it states:
"And the principle that the servient tenement
may not be subjected to new and unreasonable
burdens not contemplated by the parties has also
been recognized in a number of other cases."
Therefore, it is submitted that even if plaintiff
still owned a I/5th interest in the right-of-way, it is
clear from the law that he would not have the right
to expand the use over that originally contemplated at
the time that th egrant was originally made, as the
original grantor did not own the property to the east
which the plaintiff is now trying to include, and in no
circumstances should the plaintiff be permitted to en·
large the use and require the defendant to remove the
fence.

CONCLUSION
From all the circumstances in the case, the defend·
ant concludes that the judgment of the lower court
12

should be affirmed as he owns the fee title to the property, and even without fee title the plaintiff is not
entitled to enlarge the use on the right-of-way to include more than that originally contemplated by the
grantor creating the right-of-way.
Respectfully submitted,
LOTHAIRE R. RICH
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent
16 East Stratford Avenue

Salt Lake City, Utah
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